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Abstract
In this paper, we account for boards’ misperceptions when replacing a top man-
ager by differentiating between managerial turnovers following actual poor perfor-
mance and managerial turnovers following seemingly poor performance due to bad
luck in order to investigate their subsequent effects on performance. We focus on
managerial changes within football organizations and analyze dismissals from the
top European leagues. To account for the mean reversion of performance, we create
a control group of non-dismissals using the nearest neighbor approach. To account
for boards’ misperceptions, we differentiate between dismissals and non-dismissals
that occur either due to poor playing performance on the pitch or due to a sequence
of bad luck, which is measured using "expected goals". We find that dismissals after
poor playing performance on the pitch increase subsequent performance, while dis-
missals after a series of bad luck do not. Our results have important implications
regarding the design of future turnover studies and the costs of boards’ ineffective
turnover decisions.
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1 Introduction
Top managers are typically viewed as critical to the success or failure of organizations
(Alexandridis, Doukas, & Mavis, 2018). Thus, replacing a top manager is one of the most
important decisions made by boards of directors. However, the consequences for per-
formance ensuing from top management turnover are widely debated (e.g., Giambatista,
Rowe, & Riaz, 2005).
Empirically, it is challenging to properly investigate the effectiveness of replacing top
managers because poor performance that triggers managerial turnover tends to coincide
with bad luck and low manager ability (Huson, Malatesta, & Parrino, 2004). Thus, to
account for mean reversion in performance, it is crucial to compare turnover events to a
control group of non-turnover events with similarly poor prior performance (Giambatista
et al., 2005). Moreover, Kaplan and Minton (2012) and Jenter and Kanaan (2015) show
that corporate boards fail to filter out exogenous elements, and CEOs are dismissed after
poor firm performance caused by factors beyond their control. This finding implies that
boards falsely infer top management ability from exogenous performance components,
which could disguise any positive replacement effect. While several studies considered
the selectivity of management turnovers in large public firms (Huson et al., 2004) and
sports teams (e.g., Paola & Scoppa, 2012; van Ours & van Tuijl, 2016), how boards’
misperceptions when replacing a top manager affect the turnover-performance relationship
has been neglected so far.
In this paper, we differentiate between managerial turnovers following actual poor per-
formance and managerial turnovers following seemingly poor performance due to bad luck
or other exogenous factors. To do so, we focus on managerial changes within football orga-
nizations. Football is a multibillion-dollar industry, and football clubs’ boards frequently
dismiss their head coaches which usually attracts high media attention. Furthermore,
sports is an important context in which to study leader succession, and the use of data
from sports organizations is well established in the literature (Giambatista et al., 2005).
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Using the sports industry offers several advantages compared to conventional industries.
First, the main objective of football clubs is to win as many games as possible, whereas
the objectives of conventional firms are less clear (Hughes, Hughes, Mellahi, & Guermat,
2010). Second, team performance is publicly observed on a weekly basis, while accounting
measures of firm performance are mostly annual. Finally, the industry is relatively homo-
geneous, with teams having similar organizational structures and technology constraints
(Audas, Dobson, & Goddard, 2002).
In the football industry, exogenous factors are likely to play an even more important
role than in conventional industries. Because football is a low-scoring sport, the random
component in a single game is estimated to be approximately 50% (Anderson & Sally,
2013). Several studies have shown that decision makers underestimate the role of ran-
domness in match outcomes and assign too much weight to the observed outcomes when
they evaluate performance, which is commonly referred to as the outcome bias (e.g., Lef-
gren, Platt, & Price, 2015; Gauriot & Page, 2018). As a consequence, dismissal decisions
of football club boards are prone to be based on misperceptions when exogenous factors
shaped match outcomes (Brechot & Flepp, 2018).
This paper is the first that differentiates between dismissals and counterfactual dis-
missals that occur either due to poor playing performance on the pitch (wise dismissals)
or due to a sequence of bad luck (unwise dismissals). If head coaches matter and replac-
ing a bad manager with a more skilled one does have an impact, we expect that a team’s
performance would improve after wise dismissals when compared to a control group of
teams with similar poor playing performance on the pitch but with no dismissal. After
unwise dismissals, however, we expect that team performance would not improve com-
pared to a control group of non-dismissal teams with a similar string of bad luck, due to
the mean-reverting performance of both groups.
We use match-level data from the English Premier League, the French Ligue 1, the
German Bundesliga, the Italian Serie A and the Spanish La Liga in the five seasons
2
from 2013/2014 to 2017/2018. During this sample period, we registered 144 involuntary
in-season coach dismissals. Following van Ours and van Tuijl (2016), we create a control
group in which a similar performance below expectations did not trigger a dismissal. Using
nearest neighbor matching based on the same team and similar "cumulative surprise", i.e.,
the sum of the differences between the number of actual points and expected points derived
from betting odds, we were able to match 59 actual dismissals to 56 non-dismissals.1
To differentiate between wise and unwise dismissals, we compare the ranking of the
teams in the official league table to a ranking of teams based on expected goals at the time
of the (non-)dismissal decision. Expected goals (xG) reflect the sum of quantified scoring
chances within a match and thus form a performance evaluation metric that is less prone
to randomness because scoring chances occur much more frequently than actual goals.2
As a result, the rank in the xG league should reflect a team’s playing quality on the pitch
better than the rank in the official league table because the latter is fully subject to the
random component in match outcomes.
We classify a dismissal as being wise if the rank based on xG is either worse, equal,
or only one rank better than the ranking in the official league table. In such situations,
teams fall short of expectations due to poor playing performance on the pitch, and the
replacement of the coach appears justified. If the rank based on xG is more than one
rank higher than the actual rank, we classify dismissals as being unwise because such
teams likely performed below expectations due to bad luck. Conversely, we classify a non-
dismissal as being unwise if the rank based on xG is more than one rank worse than the
rank based on the official league table, and we classify it as wise otherwise. To account for
biased club board decisions and mean reversion effects, we must compare dismissals after
poor playing performance on the pitch to non-dismissals after poor playing performance
1 Several non-dismissals in the control group are matched to multiple actual dismissals.
2 We employ shots as proxies for scoring changes because shots are direct attempts to score goals. In the 2017/18 season
of the English Premier League, the average number of total shots per match was 24.4 compared to the average number
of total goals of 2.7.
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on the pitch (wise dismissals vs. unwise non-dismissals) and dismissals after bad luck to
non-dismissals after bad luck (unwise dismissals vs. wise non-dismissals).
Using a team-season fixed effects regression model, we find that team performance
significantly increases after wise dismissals but not after unwise non-dismissals. Thus, the
F-test for equality of parameters is rejected, which implies that replacing the coach has a
positive effect if the team performed below expectations due to insufficient playing quality
on the pitch. By contrast, we find that team performance similarly increases after both
unwise dismissals and wise non-dismissals. Thus, in situations where the team performed
below expectations due to bad luck, team performance reverts to the mean independently
of whether or not the coach has been dismissed. These results are robust to various
methods regarding the classification of dismissals, the calculation of expected goals, and
the matching of the control group.
Our paper makes several major contributions to the literature on managerial turnover
and performance. First, we account for boards’ biased decision making and show that
the post-turnover performance critically depends on the situation preceding the turnover
decision. A replacement of the manager is beneficial only if poor quality was indeed the
driver that led to a performance below expectations. If, however, a replacement decision
is triggered when bad luck was the main cause of poor performance, a replacement of the
manager has no subsequent effect on performance. Second, our results could explain the
mixed empirical findings in the literature. Depending on the fraction of turnover decisions
that are based on boards’ misjudgments in the sample, the average post-performance ef-
fect of the managerial change is biased towards zero due to the effect of mean reversion.
Finally, the disclosure of suboptimal turnover decisions that trigger only financial conse-
quences with no performance effects is complex. Because the post-turnover performance
also improves after unwise turnovers, boards may evaluate their decisions as justified
even though the same result could have been achieved without replacing the manager.
Thus, boards should complement their existing performance evaluation strategies with
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more data-driven approaches to become aware of exogenous factors that may have shaped
organizational performance.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we review the
literature and derive the hypotheses. In Section 3, we present our empirical methods. In
Section 4, we present the results and in Section 5 we conclude.
2 Related literature and hypotheses
The bulk of the empirical evidence on managerial turnover and subsequent firm perfor-
mance comes from event studies investigating the stock price reaction to top management
turnover news. While most studies find significantly positive abnormal returns around
managerial turnovers (e.g. Weisbach, 1988; Bonnier & Bruner, 1989), some studies fail
to find any stock market reaction (e.g. Reinganum, 1985; Warner, Watts, & Wruck,
1988). However, the results from event studies are difficult to interpret because stock
price reactions only reflect investors’ expectations around the news event (Denis & Denis,
1995).
Several studies thus examine the development of accounting data over several years
before and after the turnover. Using a sample of 721 turnovers between 1985 and 1988,
Denis and Denis (1995) find that operating performance, measured as the ratio of oper-
ating income to total assets (OROA), improves significantly after forced turnovers and
to a lesser extent also after voluntary turnovers. Further, Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary
(2010) proxy CEO ability by pay and firm performance under the CEO. Using a sample of
298 CEO departures between 1992 and 2002, they find that the post-departure industry-
adjusted return on assets is worse if prior performance and prior relative pay were higher.
Thus, their results provide evidence that CEO ability positively contributes to firm value.
By contrast, Wiersema (2002) finds that neither the operating earnings nor the return on
assets significantly improved after the 83 CEO dismissals that occurred in the 500 largest
public US companies between 1997 and 1998.
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Huson et al. (2004) criticize the use of unadjusted and industry-adjusted operating
performance measures because poor performance tends to coincide with bad luck and low
manager ability. Thus, an increase in subsequent accounting performance could be either
due to the higher ability of the new manager or due to mean reversion of the operating
performance measures. To account for this, Huson et al. (2004) construct a control group of
similar firms without a turnover and adjust each sample firm’s performance by subtracting
the median performance of its comparison firm. In particular, they match each sample firm
to a comparison firm with the same two-digit SIC code and a similar performance of ±10%
over the year before the turnover. Using 883 voluntary and 119 forced CEO turnovers of
large public firms during the 1971–1994 period, the authors find that the average change
in the control group-adjusted OROA is positive and significant and that this effect is
stronger for forced turnovers. Thus, Huson et al. (2004) conclude that managerial quality
increases after a CEO turnover, which translates into higher operating performance.
In a recent paper, Alexandridis et al. (2018) examine the effect of forced CEO re-
placements on merger and acquisition performance. Using a final sample of 110 forced
turnovers between 1994 and 2011, they find that the investment decisions of new CEOs
improve relative to their predecessors. Further, the authors construct a control group
of similar voluntary turnovers using the propensity score matching approach and show
that mean reversion is not the driver of their results. Overall, the empirical evidence
from turnovers in traditional industries remains mixed, with the bulk of studies finding a
positive performance effect.
Several issues, however, remain unsolved. First, prior studies employed annual data
but most turnovers take place within a given financial year of a firm. Thus, the operating
or investment performance in the turnover year is not clearly attributable to either the old
or the new manager. Second, operating performance measures are sensitive to managerial
discretion. For example, Denis and Denis (1995) note that new managers might sell
underperforming assets under value to boost operating performance. Finally, long-term
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strategies of the new manager might only be reflected in operating performance after
several years (Ter Weel, 2011). To overcome these problems, several studies investigate
the impact of managerial turnover in the sports industry. More specifically, these studies
mostly concentrate on the dismissals of head coaches of football teams and the subsequent
changes in match results on the pitch. Match results are thereby straightforward, observed
weekly and clearly attributable to either the old or the new coach. Furthermore, decisions
of the head coach with respect to the player line-up and playing strategy are effective
immediately (Ter Weel, 2011).
The sports literature also acknowledged the selectivity of coach dismissals after a
sequence of results below expectations and the need to form an appropriate control group.
To find a counterfactual dismissal for each actual dismissal, Paola and Scoppa (2012)
employed a nearest neighbor matching based on the ranking difference, the number of
points obtained in the most recent four matches and the period in a particular season.
Using 12 seasons from the Italian Serie A between 1997/98 and 2008/09, Paola and Scoppa
(2012) find that the increase in team performance is solely due to mean reversion. Thus,
changing the coach does not causally affect team performance. This finding is in line with
several other studies using a control group of counterfactual dismissals (e.g., Balduck,
Buelens, & Philippaerts, 2010; Ter Weel, 2011).
More recently, van Ours and van Tuijl (2016) formed the control group by matching
the same team to itself based on the "cumulative surprise". The cumulative surprise
measures how far teams perform below expectations and is calculated as the sum of the
differences between the number of actual points and the expected points derived from
betting odds. Using 36 dismissals and 33 matched counterfactual dismissals from the
Dutch Eredivisie in the 14 seasons between 2000/01 and 2013/14, the authors also find
that forced coach replacements do not improve team performance. Besters, van Ours,
and van Tuijl (2016) replicate the methods of van Ours and van Tuijl (2016) using 45
dismissals and 34 counterfactual dismissals from the English Premier League between
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2000/01 and 2014/15. Similarly, they conclude that, on average, performance does not
improve following a coach’s dismissal and that a successful managerial turnover remains
highly unpredictable. Overall, most empirical evidence from professional football shows
that coach dismissals have no causal effect on subsequent team performance.3
However, the effect of boards’ misperceptions when replacing a top manager on per-
formance has been neglected in the literature so far. While standard economic theory
suggests that the board of directors should ignore the components of firm performance
that are exogenous, several studies show that boards’ CEO retention decisions are affected
by exogenous shocks (Jenter & Kanaan, 2015). For example, Kaplan and Minton (2012)
find that board-driven CEO turnover is significantly related not only to firm-specific per-
formance but also to industry performance and the performance of the overall market
which are beyond the control of the CEO. Further, Jenter and Kanaan (2015) use 3,365
CEO turnovers from 1993 to 2009 and find that corporate boards are more likely to fire a
CEO after negative exogenous performance shocks. Thus, boards falsely infer CEO qual-
ity from exogenous performance components. Because the exogenous component is even
more considerable in football match outcomes, it appears likely that club boards similarly
attribute bad luck to poor coach quality when making dismissal decisions.
Thus, to properly test whether a coach’s dismissal is beneficial for a football club, we
differentiate between dismissals and non-dismissals that occur due to either poor perfor-
mance on the pitch or just bad luck. We refer to a dismissal as being wise if a team
performed below expectations due to poor playing performance on the pitch and to a
dismissal as being unwise if a team performed below expectations due to a sequence of
bad luck. Conversely, we refer to a counterfactual non-dismissal as being wise if a team
performed below expectations due to a sequence of bad luck and a counterfactual non-
dismissal as being unwise if a team performed below expectations due to poor playing
3 Madum (2016) and Bryson, Buraimo, and Simmons (2018) are two notable exceptions. Madum (2016) finds a positive
performance effect, but only for home games, and Bryson et al. (2018) find a positive performance effect after dismissals,
but no effect after voluntary quits.
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performance on the pitch. Table 1 illustrates this theoretical decomposition of dismissals
and non-dismissals.
Table 1
Theoretical decomposition of dismissals and non-dismissals.
dismissal non-dismissal
wise Below expectations due to poor
playing performance on the pitch
Below expectations due to
a sequence of bad luck
unwise Below expectations due to
a sequence of bad luck
Below expectations due to poor
playing performance on the pitch
To gain insight from this decomposition, dismissals after poor playing performance
on the pitch must be compared to non-dismissals after poor playing performance on the
pitch, and dismissals after bad luck must be compared non-dismissals after bad luck. We
expect that a dismissal is beneficial for the team if a coach whose team played poorly on
the pitch is replaced. Thus, we formulate the first hypothesis as follows:
H1. Wise dismissals improve performance relative to a control group with a similar
poor performance on the pitch but with no dismissals (unwise non-dismissals).
We expect the performance following an unwise dismissal to increase in a manner
similar to that following wise non-dismissals because of simple mean reversion. Thus, we
hypothesize the following:
H2. Unwise dismissals do not improve performance relative to a control group with
similar bad luck but with no dismissals (wise non-dismissals).
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In the next section, we present our methods and outline how we classify (non-)dismissals
as wise or unwise in order to test our hypotheses.
3 Methods
3.1 Data
We employ data from the English Premier League, the French Ligue 1, the German
Bundesliga, the Italian Serie A and the Spanish La Liga for the five seasons from 2013/2014
to 2017/2018. In total, our data set contains 9,130 matches for which we collected the
date, the teams playing, the final match score, and the head coaches of the teams. For
every in-season coaching change, we recorded whether it was a dismissal or a voluntary
quit.4 As a result, we registered 144 in-season coach dismissals during our sample period.
Additionally, we collected betting odds from the bookmaker B365 for each match and the
final rank of all clubs in the previous season.5
3.2 Treatment and control group
Because dismissals are not exogenous, we construct a control group of teams without a
dismissal but otherwise identical characteristics to infer the causal effect of dismissals on
team performance. We replicate the methods of van Ours and van Tuijl (2016) and match
dismissals (treatment group) to non-dismissals (control group) based on the same team
and the closest "cumulative surprise" (CS) using the nearest neighbor approach. The CS
measures deviations from expectations and is defined as the sum of the differences between
the actual number of points won in a match and the expected number of points based on
4 The data mainly stems from www.transfermarkt.com and www.football-data.co.uk. Following van Ours and van Tuijl
(2016), we ignore coaching changes within the first four and last four match weeks. Further, following Besters et al.
(2016), we only consider the first coach dismissal of a team within a season. For each coaching change, we documented
at least one source that unambiguously states that the change was involuntarily. To validate our data collection, we
compared our list of dismissals in the Premier League for the seasons 2013/14 and 2014/15 to the list of dismissals from
Besters et al. (2016). The lists are identical, with the only exception being Crystal Palace in 2014/15 where we ignored
the dismissal of Keith Millen in matchweek 2, but considered the dismissal of Neil Warnock in matchweek 18 instead.
5 We downloaded the betting odds from www.football-data.co.uk. For two matches where the betting odds from B365 were
missing, we used the odds from Bwin.
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betting odds.6 To qualify for the control group, a non-dismissal must stem from another
season without managerial change, and the CS values must not differ more than 0.5.7 A
matching based on the same team accounts for unobserved heterogeneity among teams
because some teams might be more likely to dismiss a coach under similar circumstances
than other teams (van Ours & van Tuijl, 2016). Further, matching controls for time-
constant seasonal aspirations of teams, such as qualifying for the UEFA Champions League
or avoiding relegation. At the same time, matching counterfactual situations based on the
CS ensures that the control group team similarly performed below expectations without
dismissing the coach afterwards.
Following this matching procedure, we were able to match 59 out of 144 actual dis-
missals to 56 non-dismissals.8
3.3 Wise and unwise (non-)dismissals
The teams from both the treatment and control group performed similarly below expec-
tations around the (non-)dismissal. However, disappointing results below expectations
could either be due to poor team performance on the pitch or simply due to bad luck.
Because football is a low-scoring game, a team might occasionally lose a game or end a
match in a draw against expectations, even though the team played well on the pitch.
Thus, we need a measure of performance that is less prone to the randomness associated
with match results.
To do so, we draw on the concept of "expected goals" (xG) based on the sum of
quantified scoring chances.9 Scoring chances are the second to the last step in the goal
production process, and all teams try to create valuable chances in order to score goals.
However, scoring chances occur much more often than goals, and thus, the expected goal
6 The expected number of points is calculated as [(probability of win)·3] + [(probability of draw)·1]. For more detailed
information, see van Ours and van Tuijl (2016).
7 As for actual dismissals, we ignore non-dismissals within the first four and last four matches within a season. Alternative
maximum CS differences of 0.1, 0.25, 0.75 and 1.0 do not alter our main conclusions.
8 Several non-dismissals in the control group are matched to multiple actual dismissals.
9 See Brechot and Flepp (2018) for a detailed description of expected goals as measure of performance.
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metric is less prone to random variation. Indeed, Brechot and Flepp (2018) show that the
xG metric contains more relevant information with regard to future team performance
than do match outcomes.
Following Brechot and Flepp (2018), we consider shots as scoring chances and estimate
their scoring probability based on the distance, the angle, the rule setting of the shot
(i.e., open play, free kick or penalty kick), and the body part used. Additionally, we
include team fixed effects in the logistic regression to account for unobserved team quality
characteristics. In total, we estimate the scoring probability of 214,194 shots from all
9,130 matches in our sample.10 Finally, we aggregate the quantified scoring chances for
each team within each match to derive the number of expected goals per match.
The expected goal metric allows us to determine the better team on the pitch in terms
of creating valuable scoring chances. Instead of awarding the number of points based on
the actual goals within a match, i.e., three for a win, one for a draw and zero for a loss,
we award the points based on expected goals.11 A team wins the match and gains three
points based on expected goals if it scores 0.5 or more expected goals than its opponent.
If the expected goals of both teams lie within 0.5, we consider it a draw, and each team
receives one point. Otherwise, the team loses the match based on expected goals and no
points are gained. Finally, we rank the teams according to their points based on expected
goals and construct an xG league table.
The rank in the xG league table should reflect a team’s playing quality on the pitch
more accurately than the rank in the official league table (OLT), because the OLT is solely
based on actual match outcomes where bad luck fully translates into fewer points and a
lower rank. For example, a team could play well on the pitch and win a match in terms
of expected goals because that team created scoring chances of higher total value than its
opponent. However, this team might actually lose the match in terms of outcomes because
the scoring chances did not translate into actual goals. In such situations, the rank in the
10 The shot data are provided by the measurement and data analytics company Nielsen.
11 Note that points based on expected goals differ fundamentally from expected points based on betting odds. The first are
based on actual performance on the pitch after the game whereas the latter are based on expectations prior to the game.
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xG table should be higher than the rank in the OLT. In other situations where the team
played poorly on the pitch, the rank in the xG table should be equal to or worse than the
rank in the OLT. Consequently, we use the difference between the rank in the OLT and
the rank in the xG table to differentiate between wise and unwise (non-)dismissals.
Figure 1 plots the rank in the OLT against the rank in the xG table at the time a
(non-)dismissal took place. We categorize a dismissal as being wise if the rank based on
Figure 1
Rank in the OLT vs. rank in the xG table of all matched dismissals and non-dismissals. The dotted line marks the cutoff
for wise and unwise dismissals. The dashed line marks the cutoff for wise and unwise non-dismissals.
xG is equal to or lower than the rank in the OLT. Additionally, we allow for a margin in
favor of wise dismissals because we do not know the detailed circumstances that triggered
the decision to dismiss the coach. In particular, we still categorize a dismissal as being
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wise even if the rank based on xG is one rank better than the rank in the OLT. Only if
the ranking based on xG is more than one rank better we do categorize a dismissal as
being unwise.12 Such teams performed below expectations due to bad luck, because their
ranking based on xG indicates a higher playing quality on the pitch. The dotted line in
Figure 1 marks the cutoff for wise and unwise dismissals. Dismissals above the dotted
line are categorized as being wise, whereas dismissals below the dotted line are classified
as being unwise. Conversely, we categorize a non-dismissal as being unwise if the ranking
based on xG is more than one rank worse than the ranking based on the OLT, and we
categorize it as wise otherwise. The dashed line in Figure 1 marks the cutoff for wise and
unwise non-dismissals. As a result, all dismissals and non-dismissals in the area between
the dashed and the dotted line are categorized as being wise.
3.4 Econometric specification
Following van Ours and van Tuijl (2016), we estimate the following regression model:
γijk = αik + β1 · wise dismissalijk + β2 · unwise non-dismissalijk
+ β3 · unwise dismissalijk + β4 · wise non-dismissalijk
+ γ1 · homeijk + γ2 · rank opponentijk + ijk
(1)
where i denotes the team, j indicates the match and k refers to the season. For the
dependent variable γijk, we employ the same performance measures as in van Ours and
van Tuijl (2016), namely, the number of points gained in a match (points), a dummy
variable that indicates whether a match was won or not (win) and the goal difference in
a match (goal diff ). The (non-)dismissal variables are dummies that indicate whether or
not there has been a (non-)dismissal of the relevant type earlier in the season. We are
mainly interested in the difference between the coefficients β1 and β2 as well as in the
12 In Section 4, we test the robustness of our results based on an alternative margin.
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difference between the coefficients β3 and β4. According to our hypotheses, we expect β1
to be significantly larger than β2 (H1) and β3 to be equal to β4 (H2).
To account for unobserved differences in team quality within a particular season, we
include team-season fixed effects αik. Furthermore, we control for home field advantage by
including the dummy variable home and proxy the strength of the opponent by controlling
for the final rank of the opponent in the previous season (rank opponent).13
4 Results
4.1 Main results
Table 2 presents our main results for the four (non-)dismissal groups.14 The total number
of observations is 4,054 and consists of 2,198 matches from teams with a dismissal and
1,856 matches from teams with a non-dismissal.15 Column (1) shows that after a wise
dismissal, the number of points per match is 0.24 higher than before the dismissal. By
contrast, the effect for the relevant control group of unwise non-dismissals is -0.09 points
per match. The F-test for equality shows that these parameters are significantly different
from each other (F = 4.76***). The findings for win and goal diff as performance measures
in Columns (2) and (3) are equivalent. Thus, our first hypothesis that wise dismissals
improve performance relative to unwise non-dismissals is confirmed.
Column (1) further shows that the number of points per match after unwise dismissals
also significantly improves by 0.36. However, wise non-dismissals similarly improve team
performance by 0.34 points per match. Indeed, the F-test for equality of these parameters
cannot be rejected (F = 0.09). This result suggests that the improvement in points per
13 As in van Ours and van Tuijl (2016), we assign the rank 20 (18 for the Bundesliga) to promoted teams.
14 We also replicated the approach of van Ours and van Tuijl (2016) by pooling all dismissals in one treatment group and
all non-dismissals in one control group. Like van Ours and van Tuijl (2016), we fail to find any significant performance
difference between the treatment and the control group.
15 Dismissal observations consist of 11×34 matches from the German Bundesliga and 48×38 matches from the other leagues.
Non-dismissal observations consist of 11×34 matches from the German Bundesliga and 39×38 matches from the other
leagues. Nine out of the 50 non-dismissal team-seasons serve as the control group for two dismissals. Of those, 3 have
the same non-dismissal date, whereas 6 have a different non-dismissal date. For the latter, we employ the earliest non-
dismissal date for the main analysis. However, if we double these observations and use the exact non-dismissal dates, the
results remain unchanged.
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Table 2
Main results.
points win goal diff
(1) (2) (3)
wise dismissal 0.24*** 0.08*** 0.29***
(0.059) (0.023) (0.084)
unwise non-dismissal -0.09 -0.01 -0.14
(0.137) (0.052) (0.120)
unwise dismissal 0.36*** 0.13*** 0.37***
(0.062) (0.027) (0.112)
wise non-dismissal 0.34*** 0.13*** 0.39***
(0.055) (0.020) (0.086)
home 0.45*** 0.15*** 0.74***
(0.034) (0.010) (0.047)
rank opponent 0.05*** 0.016*** 0.08***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.005)
team-season fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 overall 9.30% 7.65% 11.30%
N 4,054 4,054 4,054
F-test β1 = β2 4.76** 2.96* 4.03**
F-test β3 = β4 0.09 0.01 0.02
Notes: The table reports the coefficients estimated from a team-season fixed effects regression model with standard errors
corrected for heteroskedasticity. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all models, *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
match after unwise dismissals would also have occurred if the coach had not been dismissed
after all. The F-tests in Column (2) and (3) confirm this finding. Overall, our second
hypothesis that unwise dismissals do not improve performance relative to the relevant
control group of wise non-dismissals is supported.
4.2 Robustness checks
In this subsection, we address potential concerns regarding the robustness of our main
results. First, a margin of one rank between the OLT and the table based on xG might
not be sufficient to identify unwise (non-)dismissals. Thus, we extend the margin to -2
ranks for wise dismissals and to +2 ranks for wise non-dismissals. Column (1) of Table 3
shows the results for this alternative categorization. Again, the F-tests reveal that wise
dismissals significantly increase the number of points gained within a match compared to
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unwise non-dismissals, whereas unwise dismissals do not improve performance compared
to wise non-dismissals.
Table 3
Robustness checks.
points
-2/+2 margin alt. xG model alt. matching
(1) (2) (3)
wise dismissal 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.31***
(0.048) (0.063) (0.049)
unwise non-dismissal -0.36*** -0.08 -0.10
(0.094) (0.152) (0.107)
unwise dismissal 0.44*** 0.48*** 0.39***
(0.079) (0.083) (0.038)
wise non-dismissal 0.33*** 0.28*** 0.33***
(0.053) (0.067) (0.048)
home 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.47***
(0.034) (0.042) (0.023)
rank opponent 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
team-season fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 overall 9.21% 9.53% 8.77%
N 4,054 2,862 8,504
F-test β1 = β2 29.89*** 3.40* 12.20***
F-test β3 = β4 1.33 3.51* 1.11
Notes: The table reports the coefficients estimated from a team-season fixed effects regression model with standard errors
corrected for heteroskedasticity. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all models, *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Second, our analysis relies on the accuracy of xG as a performance evaluation measure.
To test whether our results are robust to an alternative xG model other than the one
employed by Brechot and Flepp (2018), we collected the xG values and the table ranks
based on the xG from www.understat.com. Understat calculates expected goals based
on a neural network prediction algorithm, including information on goal distance, angle,
situation, last action, shot type, attack type, errors and "big chances", pass characteristics,
dribbled players, and game state. Unfortunately, the data on www.understat.com are only
available from the season 2014/15 onward. Thus, we drop all matches from the 2013/14
season and re-run our complete analysis with data from 2014/15 to 2017/18. This results
in a matching of 41 dismissals to 39 non-dismissals. Column (2) of Table 3 shows the
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results if we employ the xG values from the alternative xG model of www.understat.com to
categorize wise and unwise (non-)dismissals. The F-test rejects the equality of parameters
of wise and unwise non-dismissals at the 10%-level. Surprisingly, the F-test that compares
unwise dismissals and wise non-dismissals is also significant, indicating that teams also
perform slightly better after unwise dismissals.
In a third robustness check, we omit the restriction that each dismissal team-season has
to be matched to a non-dismissal team-season of the same team. Thus, for every dismissal,
we now match a non-dismissal only based on CS. This alternative, less restrictive matching
procedure ignores the heterogeneity across teams but allows us to match a non-dismissal
to all 144 dismissals in our sample. As a consequence, the number of observations in
the regression more than doubles to 8,504. Column (3) of Table 3 shows that the results
remain very similar even if we apply this alternative matching procedure.16 Overall,
the robustness checks show that our main findings also hold under different alternative
methods.
5 Conclusion
The findings of this paper show that the effect of managerial turnover on performance
critically depends on whether boards falsely attributed bad luck to low manager ability or
whether performance was indeed poor when deciding to replace the manager. Analyzing
head-coach dismissals in European football, we show that dismissals after poor playing
performance on the pitch increase subsequent team performance compared to a control
group while, dismissals after a series of bad luck do not.
These results offer a reconciling explanation for the mixed empirical results regarding
the effect of managerial turnover on subsequent performance. Depending on how pro-
nounced the exogenous factors and the resulting boards’ misperceptions are, the average
16 Additionally, we run all alternative specifications with win and goal diff as dependent performance variables. The results
remain unchanged except for the alternative xG model where the coefficient of wise dismissals is still larger than the
coefficient of unwise non-dismissals, but equality of the coefficients cannot be rejected.
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effect might be biased towards zero. Thus, our paper has important implications for the
design of future studies that investigate the relationship between turnover and subsequent
performance. Without accounting for the misperceptions of boards in their turnover de-
cisions, the results might be misleading.
Furthermore, while corporate boards partially adjust for peer group performance when
assessing CEOs, they appear to concentrate on the largest firms in their industry but fail
to adjust for other, less obvious exogenous performance components (Jenter & Kanaan,
2015). Such less obvious components might only be filtered out by the use of systematic
data-driven approaches. Similarly, football club boards should complement their existing
decision-making strategies with more data-driven approaches, such as the use of expected
goals to reduce ineffective decisions. Replacing a head coach is very costly, and the costs
associated with unwise dismissals should better be invested in new players to increase the
playing strength of the team.
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